Remington Rand, Inc. v. Thurman E. O\u27Neil et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Thurman E. O'Neil et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Glen E. Fuller; Joseph Y. Larsen, Jr.; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, No. 8598 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2723
,~ 
~ JJNIVERSITY. UTAld 
OCT 311957 
====================== LAW LH~.~~tARY 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab> "~T 
Jl ; jJ_ ~~L.-cd 
REMINGTON RAND, INC., r'1 --------~---------------u-----·--~· 
-.......J · k,. .Supren'1e Court., rr,,l .. 
a corporation, Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S. 
MACHADO, fdba A-1 Typewriter Com-
pany, Defendants, 
vs. 
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH 
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Respondents and Garnishee Defendants. 
No. 8598 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
GLEN E. FULLER and JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR. 
..... , . ·-····· ~ . , .·.-.r .. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
15 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
l L, ! I 1 1 1 Page 
STATEMENT 0 F FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Sustained Garnishees' Motion 
for Summary Judgment Because Appellant Failed to Serve 
Its Reply Within the Time Provided by Statute -------------------- 6 
II. By Accepting the Relief and Retaining the Property as 
Provided by Rule 64 D (i), Appellant is Precluded from 
Taking Further Action -------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
CO NCL USI 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
TEXTS 
4 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 42 ____________________ 12 
5 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 763 ---------------- 8 
38 C.J.S., Garnishment, Sec. 151 ------------------------------------------ 10 
STATUTES 
URCP, Rule 5 (a) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
URCP, Rule 64 D (g) ---------------------------------------------------------- 6 
URCP, Rule 64 D (h) ---------------------------------------------------------- 6 
URCP, Rule 64 D ( i) -------------------------------------------------- 6, 7, 12 
CASES 
Glenn v. Ferrell et al (Utah), 304 P.2d 380 -------------------- 9, 10 
Lyon v. Pittsburgh Aflegheny and Manchester T. Co. 
(Penn.), 169 A. 229 ------------------------------------------------------ 9 
Marsh, Jr. v. Phillips, Jr. and Coe, 77 Georgia 436____________ 9 
Phelps v. Schmuck (Kansas), 100 Pac. 2d 67 -------------------- 7, 8 
Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Dale E. Grant and Utah Cash 
Register Exchange, Inc. (Utah), 293 Pac. 2d 416 ________ 3, 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
REMINGTON RAND, INC., 
a corporation, Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S. 
MACHADO, fdba A-1 Typewriter Com-
pany, Defendants, 
vs. 
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH 
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a cor· 
poration, 
Respondents and Garnishee Defendants. 
No. 8598 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants have substantially stated the Facts of the Case 
in their brief on appeal. But to further clarify respondents' 
argument a few additional facts are inserted to supplement 
those previously stated by appellants. 
This matter was previous! y before this court under the 
same title in Case No. 83 79, and the decision which was handed 
down is found at 293 Pac. 2d 416 (R. 162). 
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Shortly subsequent to the time that the lower court granted 
Summary Judgment to respondents, appellant made a Motion 
to Amend Judgment (R. 179). Thereafter, pursuant to Stipu-
lation of respondents, (R. 182), the Second Amended Judg-
ment was signed and entered by the court, which contained the 
following provisions significant to this appeal (R. 183-184): 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant thereto, 
any and all demands and claims of Plaintiff against 
Garnishee Defendants based upon or arising out of 
any alleged claimed indebtedness of Garnishee De-
fendants to Thurman E. O'Neil, Defendant in the 
above entitled action, prior to the date of Garnishee 
Defendants' Answers to Garnishments made by Gar-
nishee Defendants on the 30th day of July, 1956, shall 
not be further maintained against Garnishee Defend-
ants by way of garnishment proceedings. 
FURTHER ORDERED, that the Motion of Plaintiff 
for leave to file an Amended Reply to the Answer of 
said Garnishees to the Writ of Garnishment issued 
March 17, 1955, be and the same is hereby denied; 
FURTHER ORDERED, that the following personal 
property is ad judged to be the property of Defendant 
Thurman E. O'Neil: 
3 Cole Steel Cabinets ( 1 damaged) 
1 Air Compressor (Par M15 A17994) 
3 Parts cabinets with parts 
1 Supreme Power Cleaner 
1 Remington Cash Register 41882 A 339 
1 National Cash Register 2924392 1722E 
1 Used National Cash Register, Service Station 
Model 1082 with grey, slick finish (only service 
station model on premises) 
The provision of the judgment relating to the aforesaid 
properties is not found in the original Summary Judgment 
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(R. 177-178), but was inserted in the Second Amended Judg-
ment prepared by appellant. It should also be noted at this 
point that all of the said properties were originally seized 
by Remington Rand, Inc. (appellant herein) prior to the 
former appeal in this matter and that they have retained 
possession and control of the properties at all times since and 
up to the present time, and that it was not until on or about 
Nov. 13, 1956, that the other tangible personal properties of 
these respondents were returned to them (some 9 months after 
the decision in the prior appeal.) Appellant has never returned 
the money seized from respondents' bank accounts. (See R. 
188, 189, 190, 191). 
The instructions which appellant furnished to the Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County (R. 188-189) excepted the foregoing 
personal properties from being delivered to respondents. These 
properties were the same items to which at all times during 
proceedings in the cause respondents disclaimed any ownership. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED 
GARNISHEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO SERVE ITS REPLY 
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
II. BY ACCEPTING THE RELIEF AND RETAINING 
THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED BY RULE 64 D(i), AP-
PELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING FURTHER 
ACTION. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED 
\ 
GARNISHEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO SERVE ITS REPLY 
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
Although the prior decision in this case was handed down 
on February 15, 1956 (R. 162), it was not until July 25, 1956 
(R. 160) that appellant re-served garnishments identical in 
scope and time to the ones previously served, thereby seeking 
to re-trace steps taken by it over a year previously. In its Motion 
for Summary Judgment before the lower ~ourt, garnishees 
successfully argued that the prior Supreme Court Decision and 
the effect of Rule 64 D (h) and ( i) had concluded the matter 
insofar as further proceedings by way of garnishments were 
concerned. 
Rule 64 D(g), URCP, provides that after the garnishee 
files a verified answer to the plaintiff's interrogatories-
( ( . . . the garnishee shall be relieved from further 
liability in the proceedings unless his answer shall be 
successfully controverted as hereinafter provided." 
In order to successfully controvert the answers Rule 64 
D{h), URCP, states: 
H ••• the plaintiff may, within 10 days after the ex-
piration of the time allowed for the filing of such 
answer, serve upon the garnishee and file a reply to 
the whole or any part thereof, ... '' 
Rule 64 D ( i) then provides that if the plaintiff fails to 
reply to the answer of the garnishee, he shall be deemed to 
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have accepted it as correct, and judgment may be entered there-
on. 
Rule 5 (a) , URCP, provides that every order required by 
its terms to be served and every paper requiring service shall 
be served upon each of the parties affected thereby. By using 
the word nshall" the legislature has made the failure to serve 
when required a jurisdictional defect. 
As this Court held in the prior action: 
ccThe very purpose of the rule requiring service of an 
(Answer to Reply of Garnishee' which can set forth 
new matter charging a garnishee with liability is to 
avoid such a situation as occurred in the instant case." 
In garnishment proceedings more so than in almost any 
other proceeding the rights of the parties thereto are concluded 
by the parties themselves through their interchange of inter-
rogatories and answers. By not receiving a reply to his answers 
a garnishee has every right to expect that in accordance with 
Rule 64 D(i), URCP, the judgment entered upon the basis 
of his answers will conclude the matter. 
Where the statute or rule requires, as does Rule 64 D (h), 
that the answers to the interrogatories contained in the gar-
nishment be contested within a specified time, it is incumbent 
upon the plaintiff to make a proper issue within the time al-
lowed (Phelps v. Schmuck-Kansas, 1940, 100 Pac. 2d 67). 
In this case the answers were not properly contested within the 
specified time. Thus, in the Phelps case where another sum-
mons was issued one year after a similar summons the gar-
nishee was upheld in its defense that it had filed its answer 
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to the previous summons and that within 20 days thereafter 
plaintiff did not serve upon the garnishee a notice in writing 
that plaintiff elected to take issue on the answer, and that as 
provided by the statute the answer became conclusive of the 
truth of the facts stated and that thereafter plaintiff was barred 
and had no further right to proceed against the garnishee. 
The court in the Phelps case further held that-
(( ... the plaintiff, having instituted proceedings in 
garnishment by filing her affidavit thereof on June 25, 
193 7, is not in a position to question the sufficiency 
of her own pleading and does not do so. The affidavit 
then filed proper! y started a proceeding to determine 
the liability of the garnishee." 
See also Septer v. Boyles, 147 Kan. 356, 76 P. 2nd 771. In 
Roman vs. Montgomery Iron Works et al., (Alabama 1908), 
47 So. 136, 19 L.R.A. (NS) 604, the court held: 
( ( . . . the failure of the creditor to contest the answer 
and who in the meantime permits the court to proceed 
to judgment is unlike the mere dismissal of the gar-
nishment, but is in effect an admission of the recitals 
of the answer. And a judgment rendered thereon for 
the plaintiff, if the answer admitted indebtedness, 
would be conclusive between the immediate parties, 
and one rendered for the garnishee, when the answer 
denied indebtedness, would also be conclusive as be-
tween the creditor and the garnishee." 
And from 5 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 
763, p. 61: 
((If issue is not taken on the statements of the gar-
nishee, such statements n1ust be taken as admitted, and 
the ans\ver of the garnishee is then the sole test of his 
indebtedness or liability." 
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Appellant has cited two cases in support of its position that 
a judgment such as was handed down in the previous garnish-
ment proceeding is not a judgment on the merits and therefore 
not res judicata. The first case so cited, Lyon v. Pittsburgh Alle-
gheny and Manchester T. Co., (Penn. 1933), 169 A. 229, 
can be distinguished on two grounds: ( 1) That there was no 
statute similar to the Utah garnishment rules requiring service 
of a reply to the garnishee's answer in force in Pennsylvania 
at the time of that case, and ( 2) the court there pointed out 
that the garnishees could not on their own showing prevent 
a summary judgment, this being conclusive proof in that case 
on the important question of whether the second writ was 
vexatious in nature. However, in the case at bar the garnishee 
has obtained not only a summary judgment but also a prior 
ruling of this court, thereby making it most evident that it is 
continuously being harassed by vexatious tactics. 
The second case cited by appellant is Marsh} Jr. v·. Phillips} 
Jr. and CoeJ 77 Georgia 436, and can be distinguished from 
the instant action on two grounds: ( 1) There was no statute 
similar to the Utah garnishment rules in force in Georgia in 
1886, and ( 2) the court in that case pointed out that where 
the question is can a garnishment be served again on the same 
garnishee after the judgment discharged him, the discharge 
is a judgment for him on the merits and cannot be tried 
again and re-opened except as all other judgments may be, 
that is, for fraud in procuring it or other legal reason. 
In the very recent decision of Glenn v. Ferrell et al. (Nov. 
1956), 304 Pac. 2d 380, at pages 382 and 383, Justice Crockett 
spoke for the Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous decision: 
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((Although this court has indicated that statutes 
relating to attachment and garnishment should be lib-
erally construed to effect their purpose, it has also rec-
ognized that where there is a defect which is jurisdic-
tional in nature, it must not be disregarded. 
(CW e agree with the holding of the trial court that 
the failure to serve the corporation in accordance with 
the requirements of Rule 64C renders the attachment 
defective. Accordingly, the subsequent proceedings and 
judgment were properly set aside." 
In conclusion it might be said that (t • • • in a proper case 
where the first garnishment is premature, Mutual Bldg. & Loan 
Assn. of Long Beach v. Corum, 16 Cal. App. 2nd 212, 60 Pac. 
2nd 316), or where the answer to the first summons shows 
plaintiff's claim exceeds garnishee's indebtedness (Johnson v. 
Atlanta Furniture Co., 47 Ga. App. 124, 169 S. E. 767), and 
under a permissive statute, successive writs of garnishment 
may be issued from time to time during the pendency of the 
proceedings." 38 C. J. S. (Garnishment 151). 
The case at bar is neither a proper case for, nor is there 
a Utah statute authorizing and permitting, successive writs of 
garnishment! 
II. BY ACCEPTING THE RELIEF AND RETAINING 
THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED BY RULE 64 D(i), AP-
PELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING FURTHER 
ACTION. 
As set forth in the preceding Statement of Facts, appel-
lant has for nearly two years retained the personal properties 
disclaitned by these respondents in their original garnishment 
answers. And to fortify its hold on those properties appellant 
10 
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secured the Second Amended Judgment (R. 183-184) specifi-
cally setting those properties apart as belonging to O'Neil. 
Appellant then express! y excepted those properties from being 
delivered to respondents in its instructions to the Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County (R. 188-189). 
Although appellant may contend otherwise by some 
method of attenuated reasoning, by retaining dominion over 
the properties disclaimed by respondents it has for all practical 
purposes fully accepted the relief granted under Rule 64 D (i) 
and in the decision of the court in its Second Amended Judg-
ment. 
By accepting and retaining the properties appellant's at-
tempt to again pursue the procedure of Rule 64 D(h) is wholly 
inconsistent with its claim that it has been denied its garnish-
ment rights by being refused permission to re-open garnish-
ment proceedings involving the same identical time and 
matters previously involved in a matter where it failed to serve 
its Reply within the permitted time. 
It should be noted that garnishment proceedings are pro-
visional and special in nature and should be strictly followed. 
Furthermore, appellant has not once suggested that it does 
not have other legal remedies to pursue if these respondents 
actually owe any amounts to O'Neil, and the lower court's 
decision (R. 184) specifically barred1 further garnishment 
proceedings only. But the remedy by garnishment proceedings 
has been lost through its own errors and omissions which have 
prevented the lower court from being in a position to acquire 
jurisdiction. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
What appellant would have this court do is to nullify 
the main portions of the very same Second Amended Judgment 
whereby it has sought to retain to itself all of its beneficial 
provisions. To by-pass and disregard the 10-day requirement 
of service set forth in Rule 64 D (h) would make the juris-
dictional requirement therein a mockery and meaningless. 
Litigation should be concluded in respect of special proceed-
ings more so than in other cases. If in this state garnishments 
can be re-commenced merely because the moving party. failed 
to serve its reply within the allowable 10-day period, then we 
can expect the courts and litigants to be perpetually harassed 
by the very manner of doings which have plagued these re-
spondents for two years. 
4 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 42, p. 575, 
has well summarized respondents' contentions: 
"A rule, generally observed, is that the authority of 
the court to proceed in attachment or garnishment is 
to be limited strictly, like the courts of special or limited 
jurisdiction, and that it will not enjoy any presumption 
in its favor. This rule is a corollary of the rule that at-
tachment and garnishment statutes are to be construed 
strictly against the attaching or garnishing creditor 
because they are statutory remedies in derogation of the 
common law." (Italics added.) 
The decision of the Third Judicial District Court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR. 
By: Glen E. Fuller 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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